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DIALOGUE ON STATE ACTION
Martin A. Schwartz* and Erwin Chemerinsky**
JUDGE PRATT:
We are turning to the question of state action that is billed here
as a dialogue between Professors Schwartz and Chemerinsky. We
will continue with this. It does not prevent others from intruding,
both of them are quite adept at answering questions from members
of the panel, but I think we will have a rather free-flowing
dialogue, trialogue, or whatever it gets to be.
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
Thirty years ago, a young law professor Charles Black, wrote
that the state action area is a conceptual disaster area.' Nothing has
occurred in the last three decades to make that less so, Professor
Schwartz decided we would start with twenty minutes of a quick
overview of the law with regard to state action and use the rest of
the time for dialogue with us and all the rest of the panel members.
For all purposes, under Section 1983, it is important to recognize
that the test for whether or not there is action "under the color of
* Professor Martin A. Schwartz is highly accomplished in the field of § 1983
litigation and, among other things authored a leading treatise entitled Section
1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses (3d ed. 1997), Section 1983 Litigation:
Federal Evidence (3d ed. 1999) and with Judge George C. Pratt Section 1983
Litigation: Jury Instructions (1999). In addition, Professor Schwartz is the
author of a bi-monthly column in the New York Law Journal, entitled "Public
Interest Law." Professor Schwartz has also been the co-chair of the Practicing
Law Institute annual program on § 1983 litigation for over fifteen years, and is
co-chair of its Supreme Court Review Program.
** Sydney M. Irmas Professor of Lav and Political Science, University of
Southern California Law School. This article is based on a transcript of remarks
given at the Practicing Law Institute program on Section 1983 Civil Rights
Litigation.
1 Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: "State Action, " Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69, 95 (1967).
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law," is the same test for state action.2 If you look at page 185 of
the first volume of the book, there is an outline of cases I am going
to discuss. The first two on the list are classic Supreme Court
cases, United States v. Price,3 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil,4 both of
which hold expressly that the test for "under color of state law" is
the same used to determine whether or not there is state action.5
To speak generally, we might identify two situations where the
state action issue could arise in 1983 litigation.
One deals with the government entity, the government officer
performing on the job; the other involves the government officer
being off of the job. With regard to the government officer being
on the job, there is no problem with regard to state action in that
instance. The holding of Monroe v. Pape6 states, even if the
government official is violating the constitution or violating state
or local law, there is still state action.! The much harder question,
of course, comes when the government official is off the job.
When, in that situation, can it be said that the government officer is
acting under color of state law? When, then, can it be said there is
state action? Remarkably, there is silence from the Supreme Court
on this issue. There are literally dozens, perhaps hundreds, of
lower court cases dealing with this issue.'
The main generalization I would draw from these cases is that, if
the off-duty official is invoking the authority of the government,
then the court is likely to find state action,9 but if the off-duty
official is truly acting as a private citizen, does not invoke the
2 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) (noting that § 1983's
requirement of under color of law has consistently been treated as the same
thing as the state action required under the Fourteenth Amendment); Lugar v.
Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 929 (1982) (stating that the constitutional
concept of state action satisfies the statutory requirement of action under color
of state law).
' 383 U.S. 787 (1966).
4 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
5 Price, 383 U.S. at 794; Lugar, 457 U.S. at 928-929.
6365 U.S. 167 (1961).
7 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 240-241.
8 See e.g., Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 1997); Whitney v. New
Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 1997); Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Twoed,
944 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1991); Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 1996).
9 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES,
vol. IA, § 5.5 (3d ed. 1997).
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authority of the government, then it is unlikely the court is going to
find state action."0
Interestingly, in the last several years, many of these off-duty
officer cases involved sexual harassment or sexual assault, and I
have listed for you in the outline several of these cases from
different circuits." Let's talk about a few of them. Wudike v.
Davel'2 case involves a superintendent of a local school system,
who, off the job, sexually assaulted one of the teachers and
threatened her with revocation of her teaching credentials if she
reported the incident. 3 She brought a suit under section 1983.
The question presented is: Since the school official was off the
job, is it under color of law? The Seventh Circuit held that he
acted under color of law. 4 The court emphasized that invoking his
authority as superintendent of schools to revoke her credentials
was sufficient for state action.'5
The next case I listed is Whitney v. New Mexico'" from the Tenth
Circuit. This case involves a person who is in charge of licensing
day care centers.'7 While off the job, he visits a person who wants
a license. He sexually harasses the individual and a lawsuit is
brought.'8 His defense was he was not acting under color of law, he
was acting off-duty in a private capacity.' The Tenth Circuit held
that he invoked the authority he had as a government official
regarding the licensing, and that was sufficient for state action. '
The last case I listed here is the most frequently cited sexual
harassment off-duty officer case, the Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X
'o Schwartz, § 5.5 at 497.
" Wudtke, 128 F.3d 1057; Whitney, 113 F.3d 1170; Dang lang, 944 F.2d 476.
12 128 F.3d 1057 (7th Cir. 1997).
13 Wudtke, 128 F.3d at 1059.
'4 Id. at 1064.15 id.
16 113 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 1997).
17 Id. at 1172.
18 Id.
'9 Id. at 1174 (citing Vest v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988)). "It is firmly
established that a defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law when
he abuses the position given to him by the state." Id. The complaint alleged that
Mr. Patrick harassed Ms. Whitney while he was deciding whether to grant Ms.
Whitney a day care facility license. Id.
20 Whitney, 113 F.3d at 1174-1175.
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Towed case2' from the Ninth Circuit. This case concerns a social
worker that was particularly involved in working with individuals
from southeast Asia living in his community.' 2 He would
frequently make arrangements to socially see women who he met
on the job. However, he would then harass them.' A lawsuit was
brought against him. The defense was he was acting completely
off duty, so it was not under color of law. 4
The Ninth Circuit disagreed and emphasized the off-duty officer
was invoking his government authority by scheduling the meetings
with the individuals.' Also, these women believed, if they engaged
in sexual relations with him, they would receive benefits from the
government, and that, the court found, was sufficient for state
action.26
The other type of off-duty case is the police officer who is
moonlighting, for example, as a security guard, and, again, there
are dozens and dozens of cases27 concerning the off-duty police
officer who then engages in excessive force. The question in these
cases is whether the off-duty police officer is acting under color of
law.
In Professor Schwartz's treatise on Section 1983,28 he does a
superb job of synthesizing these cases, and, therefore, I actually
quote the factors outlined in the book. These factors include:
Does the local government have a policy that officers are always
on duty?29 If so, the courts are very likely to find that the off-duty
officer is under color of law.3" An extremely important
21 944 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1991).
22Id. at 478.
23id.
24 Dang Vang, 944 F.2d at 480.
2 Id.
26 Id. "An expert in Hmong anthropology testified at trial that after fleeing
from Laos, Hmong refugees have been entirely reliant on government aid, and
as a result, are in awe of government officials." id.
27 See, e.g., Pitchell v. Callan, 13 F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1994); Delcambre v.
Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407 (5th Cir. 1981); Rogers v. Fuller, 410 F. Supp. 187
(M.D.N.C. 1976).28 MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES,
vol. IA (3d ed. 1997).
29 SCHWARTZ, § 5.5 at 496.
30 Id. Professor Schwartz lists many United States Supreme Court and lower
court cases where state action was found; see, e.g., Griffin v. Maryland, 378
778 [Vol 16
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consideration is whether the off-duty officer invokes the authority
of the government?3 Does he or she identify himself or herself as
a police officer?32 Does the person show a badge?3 Does the
person carry or use a service revolver?'
All of which, once again, goes to what I see as the central
inquiry: Is government authority being invoked? Does the person
off duty try to make an arrest? This is the clearest obvious use of
government authority. 5 Beyond this, the cases are really split 6
and it is a matter of trying to persuade the court that government
authority is used enough so that you find it under color of law.
Those are the cases that involve government power, be it on-duty
or off-duty.37 The other set of state action cases, the ones that
come to mind when we use the phrase "state action," involve
private entities and private actors.38 Here, the appropriate inquiry is
when should they be regarded as state actors?
The most recent Supreme Court case was American
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company i. Sulliran." Before
U.s. 130 (1964) (holding that off-duty sheriff, who was also park employee,
acted under color of law when he enforced the park's racial segregation policy);
Pickrel v. City of Springfield, 45 F.3d 1115 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that off-
duty police officer also employed as a restaurant security guard acted under
color of law when he became involved in an altercation with a restaurant
patron); Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding that officer acted under color of law when he shot a person to death
even though the officer was not on-duty at the time, nor did he wear a uniform.
and drove his own car at the time of the altercation).
31 SCHWARTZ, § 5.5 at 496.
32 id.
33 Id.
34 id.
35 id.
36 Id. See, e.g., Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809 (3d Cir. 1994)
(holding that off-duty officers did not act under color of law when they became
engaged in a personal altercation outside the jurisdiction); Pitchell v. Callan, 13
F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that off-duty officer did not act under color of
law when he became intoxicated and shot a guest in his home).
37 Wudtke, 128 F.3d 1057; Whitney, 113 F.3d 1170; Dang Vang, 944 F.2d 476.
38 American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan. 119 S. Ct. 977
(1999); Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995);
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
39119 S. Ct. 977 (1999).
2000
5
Schwartz and Chemerinsky: Dialogue on State Action
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2000
TOURO LAW REVIEW
we talk about the case, let me situate it in terms of the broader law
of state action. The Supreme Court has said over the last half
century there are two main exceptions to the state action doctrine;
that is, two circumstances where private conduct will be found to
be state action. One exception is called the "entanglement
exception."4 The classic statement of the entanglement exception
is that there is state action when the government affirmatively
authorizes, encourages, or facilitates unconstitutional action.4' In
this situation, either the private conduct is going to have to comply
with the constitution or the government is going to have to stop
what it is doing.42 The problem with the entanglement exception is
that the cases do not neatly fit together. There are many
inconsistencies in the decisions43 that the Supreme Court has never
resolved and to some extent, the inconsistencies are time based.
For example, before the 1964 Civil Rights Act,' which says that
private actors, hotels and restaurants and private employers cannot
discriminate, the courts went out of their way to try to find that
private discrimination was state action.
However, after the 1964 Civil Rights Act,46 it became so much
less important that private action be state actioil, because of the
statutory protection. There is also a change based on the ideology
of the Court. For example, the Warren Court47 was far more
willing and likely to find private action to be state action. The
40 ERvIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, §
6.4.4.3 (1997).
41 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 14. The Court found that "the action of state courts and
of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the
State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which
has long been established by decisions of this Court." Id.42 ERWN CHEMERINSKY, CoNsTITUTIoNAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, §
6.4.4.3.
43 Compare Shelley, 334 U.S. 1; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982);
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
"42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a.
45 Shelley, 334 U.S. 1; Pennsylvania v. Board of Girard College, 353 U.S. 230
(1957); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
46 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a.
47 From 1953 - 1969, the Warren Court was comprised of Chief Justice Earl
Warren, and Justices Clark, Douglas, Fortas, Frankfurter, Goldberg, Harlan,
Jackson, Marshall, Minton, Reed, Stewart, White and Whittaker.
780 [Vol 16
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consideration is whether the off-duty officer invokes the authority
of the government?3 Does he or she identify himself or herself as
a police officer?32 Does the person show a badge?3  Does the
person carry or use a service revolver?34
All of which, once again, goes to what I see as the central
inquiry: Is government authority being invoked? Does the person
off duty try to make an arrest? This is the clearest obvious use of
government authority.3" Beyond this, the cases are really split36
and it is a matter of trying to persuade the court that government
authority is used enough so that you find it under color of law.
Those are the cases that involve government power, be it on-duty
or off-duty.37 The other set of state action cases, the ones that
come to mind when we use the phrase "state action," involve
private entities and private actors.38 Here, the appropriate inquiry is
when should they be regarded as state actors?
The most recent Supreme Court case was American
Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan.'9 Before
U.S. 130 (1964) (holding that off-duty sheriff, who was also park employee,
acted under color of law when he enforced the park's racial segregation policy);
Pickrel v. City of Springfield, 45 F.3d 1115 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that off-
duty police officer also employed as a restaurant security guard acted under
color of law when he became involved in an altercation with a restaurant
patron); Revene v. Charles County Comm'rs, 882 F.2d 870 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding that officer acted under color of law when he shot a person to death
even though the officer was not on-duty at the time, nor did he wear a uniform,
and drove his own car at the time of the altercation).
31 SCHWARTZ, § 5.5 at 496.
2 id.
33 Id.
34 id.
35 id.
36 Id. See, e.g., Barna v. City of Perth Amboy, 42 F.3d 809 (3d Cir. 1994)
(holding that off-duty officers did not act under color of law when they became
engaged in a personal altercation outside the jurisdiction); Pitchell v. Callan, 13
F.3d 545 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that off-duty officer did not act under color of
law when he became intoxicated and shot a guest in his home).
37 Wudtke, 128 F.3d 1057; Whitney, 113 F.3d 1170; Dang Vang, 944 F.2d 476.
38 American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sullivan. 119 S. Ct. 977
(1999); Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.. 513 U.S. 374 (1995):
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
39119 S. Ct. 977 (1999).
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we talk about the case, let me situate it in terms of the broader law
of state action. The Supreme Court has said over the last half
century there are two main exceptions to the state action doctrine;
that is, two circumstances where private conduct will be found to
be state action. One exception is called the "entanglement
exception."4 The classic statement of the entanglement exception
is that there is state action when the government affirmatively
authorizes, encourages, or facilitates unconstitutional action.4' In
this situation, either the private conduct is going to have to comply
with the constitution or the government is going to have to stop
what it is doing.42 The problem with the entanglement exception is
that the cases do not neatly fit together. There are many
inconsistencies in the decisions43 that the Supreme Court has never
resolved and to some extent, the inconsistencies are time based.
For example, before the 1964 Civil Rights Act,' which says that
private actors, hotels and restaurants and private employers cannot
discriminate, the courts went out of their way to try to find that
private discrimination was state action.45
However, after the 1964 Civil Rights Act,46 it became so much
less important that private action be state action, because of the
statutory protection. There is also a change based on the ideology
of the Court. For example, the Warren Court47 was far more
willing and likely to find private action to be state action. The
40 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, §
6.4.4.3 (1997).
41 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 14. The Court found that "the action of state courts and
of judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the
State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a proposition which
has long been established by decisions of this Court." Id.42 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, §
6.4.4.3.
43 Compare Shelley, 334 U.S. 1; Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982);
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
44 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a.
45 Shelley, 334 U.S. 1; Pennsylvania v. Board of Girard College, 353 U.S. 230
(1957); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
46 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a.
47 From 1953 - 1969, the Warren Court was comprised of Chief Justice Earl
Warren, and Justices Clark, Douglas, Fortas, Frankfurter, Goldberg, Harlan,
Jackson, Marshall, Minton, Reed, Stewart, White and Whittaker.
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Burger and Rehnquist 8 Courts have been less likely to so fimd.
Also, what makes the cases inconsistent is the underlying subject
matter. If it is race discrimination, then the courts are much more
willing to find the entanglement exception to apply;49 if it is any
other constitutional right, the courts are much less likely to find the
state action doctrine to be met.5" In fact, the Second Circuit in
Lebron v. Amtrack,5" a case where the Supreme Court later granted
review, said there is a distinction between race and non-race cases
in the application of the purposely entanglement exception.
To quickly remind you and to set the stage for discussion of the
race cases, Shelley v. Kraemer 2 held that the courts cannot enforce
racially restrictive covenants even though it is a private contract.5"
The Supreme Court said courts are a branch of the government.
For the government, through its judiciary, to enforce a
discriminatory contract is state action.' The case of Burton iv
Wilmington Parking Authority ' is a landmark state action case, but
now the Supreme Court seems to either marginalize or overrule it
in some recent decisions. 56  In the Burton case, the city of
48 From 1986- Present, the Rehnquist Court is comprised of Chief Justice
William Rehnquist, and Justices Breyer, Ginsberg, Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia,
Stevens, Souter and Thomas.
49 Shelley, 334 U.S. 1; Burton, 365 U.S. 715; Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455 (1973); Lugar, 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
50 Rendell-Baker,457 U.S. 991; Morse v. North Coast Opportunities, 118 F.3d
1338 (9th Cir. 1997); Blun, 457 U.S. 991; National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988); S.P. v. City of Takoma Park,
Md., 134 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998).
51 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
52 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
53 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20-21.
541d. at 20.
55365 U.S. 715 (1961).
56 American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Company v. Sullivan, 119 S. Ct.
977, 989 (1999) (noting that "later cases have refined the vague 'joint
participation test' embodied in [Burton]"); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991
(1982) (holding that "privately owned enterprises providing services that the
State would not necessarily provide, even though they are extensively regulated.
do not fall within the ambit of Burton"); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419
U.S. 345 (1974) (holding government regulation of a utility not state action);
Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee. 412 U.S. 94
(1973) (holding that federal licensing of broadcast stations insufficient
involvement by the government for state action); Moose Lodge Number 107 v.
2000
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Wilmington, Delaware ran a parking authority, and leased space to
the Eagle Restaurant. 7 The Eagle Restaurant refused to serve
African-American customers, arguing it was not a state actor. 8
The city, in defense, argued it was not requiring discrimination, it
was just leasing the space.59 The Supreme Court held that the
leasing of government property to a private entity was sufficient
for state action.' The Supreme Court noted that the government
had the power as a term of the lease to prevent discrimination.6
The government cannot avoid its responsibility by abdication.6"
In the case of Norwood v. Harrison,"' the third case listed, the
State of Mississippi, subsequent to Brown v. Board of Education,"
developed a program of giving free textbooks to all public and
private schools in the state.65 The Supreme Court found that there
was sufficient government entanglement with the private school,
which had a discrimination policy, because of its receipt of the free
textbooks."
In contrast, there is another race case heard by the Supreme
Court where no state action was found. This case is Moose Lodge
v. Irvis, which was decided by the Burger court. 7 It involved a
private club, the Moose Lodge, that refused to admit or serve
African-Americans, but possessed a state liquor license.68 The
argument was that the state grant of a liquor license is sufficient
Iris, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972) (holding a state grant of a liquor license to a
private business insufficient action for the Constitution to apply).
5 7 Burton, 365 U.S. at 716.
58 Id.59 1d. at 717-718.
60Id. at 726.
61 Id. at 725. "[T]he Authority could have affirmatively required Eagle to
discharge the responsibilities under the Fourteenth Amendment imposed upon
the private enterprise as a consequence of state participation." Id.
62 Id. The Court noted that "no State may effectively abdicate its
responsibilities by either ignoring them or by merely failing to discharge them
whatever the motive may be." Id.
63 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
6347 U.S. 483 (1954).61 Norwood, 413 U.S. at 457.
6Id. at 469.
67 407 U.S. 163 (1972).6 Id. at 165-166.
782 [Vol 16
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government entanglement for there to be state action. 69 The
Supreme Court, however, disagreed. The Court said that the grant
of a liquor license was not sufficient entanglement for the
Constitution to apply, thus the Moose Lodge was able to keep its
liquor license and also continue its policy of discrimination."
Even after Moose Lodge, the Court is willing, in race cases, to
use the entanglement exception. The next case, Edinonson iv
Leesville Concrete, - is a case with practical significance to you in
many ways. In Edmonson, the Supreme Court held the use of
peremptory challenges based on race, even in private civil
litigation, violated equal protection.' The Supreme Court noted
that it is state law that authorizes peremptory challenges, and it is
judges and government officials who administer peremptory
challenges excusing jurors, and therefore, is another form of state
action.' Previously, in Batson v. Kentucky, the Court held that the
prosecutors cannot use a peremptory challenge based on race.74
The next case is Georgia v. McCollum, where the Supreme
Court held that if a criminal defendant uses peremptory challenges
based on race, it violates equal protection.' Who is more the
antithesis of the government than a criminal defendant? Yet, the
Supreme Court reasoned that there is sufficient state action for
peremptory challenges provided by state law and therefore, the
constitution applies.76
6 9 Id. at 171.
70 1d. at 616.
7' 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
pId. at 616.
73 Id. at 624.
74 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986).
75 505 U.S. 42, 48-55 (1992). The Court found that in order to determine
whether the Constitution prohibits criminal defendants from exercising racially
motivated peremptory challenges, certain questions must be addressed:
"whether a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges in a racially
discriminatory manner inflicts the harms addressed by Batson .... whether the
exercise of peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant constitutes state
action . . . .whether prosecutors have standing to raise this constitutional
challenge. And ... whether the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant
nonetheless precludes the extension of our precedents.. ." Id. at 48.76 Id. at 52. (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete, 500 U.S. 614, 624 (1991):
"By enforcing a discriminatory peremptory challenge, the Court 'has... elected
to place its power, property and prestige behind the [alleged] discrimination'-).
2000
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However, if we look at the non-race cases, you find a different
pattern. In the non-race cases, the Court is much less willing to
find state action. The first case examined, Lugar v. Edmonson Oil,
is one of the rare non-race cases where the entanglement exception
is found to apply.' In this case, a creditor went to a judge to get an
oral prejudgment attachment.78 The Supreme Court held that since
the law provides for prejudgment attachments and the judge issued
the order, under Shelley v. Kraemer,7 there is state action.8"
In addition, another case that is very important to this discussion
is Rendell-Baker v. Kohn.81 This case raised the question of
whether receipt of government funds is sufficient for state action.82
In this case there was a private school in Massachusetts that
provided a special education curriculum and received almost 99
percent of its operating expenses from the state.83 The teacher had
criticized the administration and was subsequently fired." The
issue was whether the almost complete government subsidy was
enough to constitute state action.85 The Supreme Court held that
contracting with the government, or receiving funds from the
government, is not enough for state action.86
In comparison, Norwood v. Harrison held that just receiving
schoolbooks was enough.87 In contrast, in Rendell-Baker, 99
percent funding was not enough for state action to be found.88
What is the difference? Well, the Court does not say expressly. In
Norwood, the Court saw the government as trying to encourage
77457 U.S. 922 (1982).78 Id. at 925. See also Va. Code § 8.01-533 (1977).
79 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
'o Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941. The Court has consistently held "that a private
party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of disputed property
is sufficient to characterize that party as a "state actor" for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
(1970); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966). Id.
81 457 U.S. 830 (1982).82 Id. at 838.83 Id. at 832.
'4 Id. at 834"
85 Id. at 840.
86 id.
87 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
88 Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840-843.
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segregation by giving free textbooks.' In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
it was not the government trying to encourage violation of First
Amendment rights," so it appears that the nature of government
actions are crucial.9 A recent case, Morse v. North Coast
Opportunities,92 applied the holding of the Court in Rendell-
Baker.93 The Court held that a private entity receiving Head Start
funds is not sufficient for state action.Y
Similarly, in Blum v. Yaretsky the case involved the question of
whether there was state action based on federal Medicaid and
Medicare regulations that seemed to encourage the transfer of
patients from specialized to general care for the sake of federal
incentives.95 The case specifically concerned the transfer of a
patient solely because of federal incentives.' The Supreme Court
held, since it is a private decision to transfer the patient from one
place to another, there was no state action, even though the
underlying reason for the transfer was to obtain government
incentives.97
89 Norwood, 413 U.S. at 463.
90 U.S. Const. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or the press;
or of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances." Id.
9' Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841-842 (the decision to discharge was not
compelled by state regulation, regulations that required committee approval on
hiring personnel were deemed to be ultimately made by private management.
and thus is not state action). Id.
92 118 F.3d 1338 (9th Cir. 1997).
93457 U.S. 830 (1982).
94 Morse, 118 F.3d at 1342. The Court held "that the fact that a private school
received almost all of its funds from the government did not transform its
actions into governmental actions." Id.
95 457 U.S. 991, 993 (1982). Respondents were patients in a nursing home,
whom were recipients of Medicaid assistance. They alleged that defendants had
not provided adequate notice either of utilization review committee decisions, to
ascertain whether the patient's continued stay in the facility is justified, or the
right to an administrative hearing to challenge these decisions. Id. at 996.
961d. at 1002.
97 Id. at 1011. The Court reasoned that "privately owned enterprises providing
services that the State would not necessarily provide, even though they are
extensively regulated, do not fall within the ambit of Burton." Id.
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Likewise, in NCAA v. Tarkanian, the Court found no state
action.98  Jerry Tarkanian was the basketball coach of the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. The National Collegiate Athletic
Association ordered him suspended because of recruiting
violations." Tarkanian sued and claimed he should be afforded
due process because he worked in a state university, and the
NCAA is largely composed of state schools."° The Supreme Court
ruled five to four that the NCAA is a private entity and therefore,
does not have to comply with the Constitution.''
If one puts together all of these non-government, non-race cases,
there is an overwhelming feeling there is an unwillingness to apply
the entanglement exception outside of race cases.
There is a recent case, S.P. v. Takoma Park,"° which involved a
private individual who filled out declarations and affidavits that led
to the civil commitment of an individual. 3 The question was:
Was this private action or state action? The court held that since it
is a private individual who filled out the certification, it is therefore
private, not state action.'" Thus, the entanglement exception did
not apply.' 5
98 488 U.S. 179 (1988).
99Id. at 186.
io Id. at 187-188, 192-193. Tarkanian argued that the NCAA was a state actor
and misused its power that it possessed through state law.
'0' Id. at 193. If the NCAA was deemed to be a state actor, then the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause would apply. The Fourteenth
Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law .... " Id.
'02 134 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1998).
103 Id. at 264. Officer Rich responded with three other officers to the Peller
home, where they found a distraught Ms. Peller, thereupon the Officers removed
and transported her to Washington Adventist Hospital. Officer Brian Rich
prepared a petition for an emergency psychiatric evaluation under Maryland
law. After examination, doctors reported that she was in fact suffering from a
mental disorder, which met the requirements for involuntary admission. Id.; see
also MD. CODE ANN., Health-Gen. I. § 10-622(a) and 10-617 (1994).
104 Id. at 268. The Court noted "that the statutory scheme . . . . is more
permissive than mandatory, and that it grants private physicians complete
medical discretion in determining whether an individual should be involuntary
committed. Id.
'
051d. at 269.
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I said there are two exceptions where private conduct constitutes
state action. One is the entanglement exception, the other is the
public functions exception. The classic statement of the public
functions exception is, if a private entity performs a task that has
been traditionally and exclusively done by the government, then
the Constitution applies."o6 I have listed for you the classic
Supreme Court cases: Marsh v. Alabama' and Terry v. Adams.Irs
The Marsh case, more than a half century ago, involved a company
town in Alabama, where the company literally owned all of the
land and ran the town.' A group of Jehovah's Witnesses came to
the town and wanted to distribute literature."' The company
claimed that since it was private property, the First Amendment
did not apply and the group should leave."' The Supreme Court
held that running a town is a task that has been traditionally done
by the government."' If a private entity runs a town, it has to
comply with the Constitution."'
We now look at Terry v. Adams,"4 the so-called, "white primary
case." After Texas was ordered to disenfranchise African-
Americans, Texas decided to no longer hold political primary
elections."5 It allowed the political parties, which were private
entities, to run their own elections."' The political parties decided
they were not going to allow African-Americans to vote." 7 The
Supreme Court in Terry held that an election for government
office, even a primary election, is a task that is traditionally done
by the government, so the public function exception applies."'
10 6 Id.
107326 U.S. 501 (1946).
'08 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
109 Marsh, 326 U.S. at 502.
10 Id. at 503.
"' Marsh, 326 U.S. at 504.
12 Id. at 506.
"3 Id. The Court noted that "[o]wnership does not always mean absolute
dominion. The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his property for use
by the public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it." Id.
14 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
"-
5 Id. at 470.
"6Id. at 471.
"7Id. at 470.
118 Id.
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If you are dealing with a public function exception, the most
important Supreme Court case for you to consider is Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison"9 because it articulates the test the Supreme
Court now uses. The Jackson case involved a customer of a private
utility company who was having her service cut-off. It has been
clearly established that if it is a government owned utility, it must
provide due process before terminating service.' ° The issue here
is: Does the private utility also have to provide due process? The
customer argued that the private utility is performing a public
function and, beyond that, the private utility has a state grant
monopoly.' The Supreme Court ruled, in an opinion written by
Justice Rehnquist, that there is no state action.'2
The Supreme Court said that the public function exception
applies only if the private entity is performing a task that has been
traditionally exclusively done by the government.2 2 The Supreme
Court held that running a utility has not been traditionally just done
by the government, and therefore, there is no state action.'24
The final case I have listed here, Hudgens v. NLRB,'25 involves
whether or not there is a First Amendment' 26 right to use privately-
owned shopping centers for speech purposes. Earlier, the Supreme
Court had suggested there was such a right, at least in some kinds
"9 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (holding that a private utility is not a state actor and
need not provide due process before terminating service). Id.
120 Id. at 358.
21 Id. at 351-52. The test must be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the state and the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself. See MARTIN
A. SCHWARTZ, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION, CLAIMS AND DEFENSES, § 5.15 at
543. vol. 1A (3d ed. 1997).
122 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
'23 Id. at 352.
124 Id. at 353.
'2' 424 U.S. 507 (1967). The union along with the National Labor Relations
Board filed an unfair labor practice charge against the owner of the North
DeKalb Shopping Center, whose general manager threatened to arrest union
employees for partaking in peaceful primary picketing of a store in the shopping
center. Id.
126 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment provides in pertinent part:
"Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or the press,
or the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances."
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of speech cases. 27 The Supreme Court had indicated that private
shopping centers perform a public function.'28 They are analogous
to the twentieth century equivalent of the town square.
Yet, in Hudgens v. NLRB, 29 the Supreme Court says, under the
United States Constitution, privately owned shopping centers are
not state actors. The public function exception does not apply and
therefore, the First Amendment does not apply.'30
The place where the public function exception is presently being
litigated is in the area of private prisons.'' There is a trend in
many parts of the country for the government to contract out the
running of prisons and jails to private entities. The issue then
arises, is the private prison to be regarded as a state actor? Are the
acts of a private prison guard under color of law? In Richardson v.
McKnight, ' the Supreme Court held that when private prison
guards are sued, they are not entitled to qualified immunity.'
There may be a good faith immunity,"r a common law defense, but
it is not the qualified immunity.' This was a five to four decision
127 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (stating that a company owned
town is a state actor and must abide by the First Amendment).
128 See Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S.
308 (1968) (holding that a large privately owned shopping center could not
enjoin peaceful union picketing on its property against a store located in the
shopping center). Id.12 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
130 Hudgens, 424 U.S. at 519-21. See SCHWARTZ. § 5.13 at 533 (stating that
Supreme Court decisions have recently narrowed the public function doctrine by
insisting that the function be historically and traditionally governmental in
nature, and the exclusive prerogative of the state).131 See Blumel v. Mylander, 919 F. Supp. 423 (M.D. Fla.1996).
132 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997). A prisoner at Tennessee's South Central
Correctional Center (SCCC brought a § 1983 action against two prison guards,
who were employees of a private, for-profit corporation which had a contract
with the state to manage the correctional center. The inmate alleged that the
guards used restraints on him, which caused injury and subjected him -to the
deprivation of' a right secured by the United States Constitution. Id.
133 See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
134 Id. at 2107-08. The afirmative defense is based on good faith andlor
probable cause. Id.
13 Id. at 2101. Mere performance of a governmental function does not support
immunity for a private person, especially one who performs a job without
government supervision or direction. Id.
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written by Justice Breyer."3 The Supreme Court expressly did not
decide the question, though, of whether private prisons are state
actors or private prison guards acted under color of law.'37 The
Court assumed it without reaching the question.'
Almost all of the lower courts so far have found that private
prisons and private prison guards are state actors.'39 They use the
public function exception. Running a prison or jail is a task that
has traditionally been done exclusively by the government. I have
listed three of the more prominent cases here, the Street4 ' case, the
Blumel"4 case, and the Lemoine42 case all find there to be state
action.
PROF. SCHWARTZ:
The most obvious case of state action is the public official who
acts in accordance with state law.'43 That is not a problem. I think
you could even put Shelley v. Kraemer'" into that category, that is,
the action of the state judge that constitutes state action, and if you
look at it that way, Shelley v. Kraemer does not have to be a
controversial state action case. However, I would also say that it
probably is not all that important for Section 1983 litigation,
because the judge is either going to be protected by immunity or
abstention or some other non-merits doctrine. But how do you
categorize Shelley v. Kraemer?'45 I do not know that it plays out in
an important way.
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
136 Id. at 2102. (Breyer, J.).
117 Id. at 2113.
139 Id.
139 See Citrano v. Allen Correctional Center, 891 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. La.
1995); Manis v. Corrections Corp. of America, 859 F. Supp. 302 (M.D. Tenn
1994; and Plain v. Flicker, 645 F. Supp. 898 (D.N.J. 1986).
140 Street v. Corrections Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1996).
141 Blumel v. Mylander, 919 F.Supp. 423 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
142 Lemoine v. New Horizan Ranch and Center, 990 F.Supp. 498 (N.D. Tex.
1998).
143 See SCHWARTZ, § 5.5 at 490.
'44 334 U.S.1 (1948) (holding that courts cannot enforce racially restrictive
covenants). Id.
145 Id.
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If you take Shelley v. Kraemer to its logical conclusion, you can
make all of the private conduct into state action, because any time
a private person allegedly violates rights, someone can take the
case to court. If the court dismisses the case, the judge's action is
state action, and now the Constitution should apply.
The Supreme Court has recoiled from that and, therefore, you do
not find Shelley v. Kraemer used much. The Shelley case is
controversial, yet, it is not New York Times v. Sullivan46 merely
just Shelley v. Kraemer with another constitutional provision? The
New York Times v. Sullivan case was a private defamation suit, a
private individual against the New York Times, a private entity.
4 7
The question is: Is there state action? The Supreme Court held
there was state action. It is a state's common law that is being
applied. 141 It is the state judge applying it and, therefore, there is
state action.
Yet, if you follow that argument, is it not state action when a
judge dismisses a case against a private individual for lack of state
action, thereby holding that the state's common law does not
protect one's rights in that instance?
PROF. SCHWARTZ:
Absolutely. How could the judge's conduct be anything other
than state action? It cannot possibly be private action. It is one of
the great functions of government. I think the answer is that much
of what a judge does in administering cases on a day-to-day basis
is not unconstitutional state action, but I think it's clearly state
action. I also think that you have to distinguish what the judge
does from what the private litigant does.
The only exception I see in the principle that the public official
who acts in accordance with state law is engaged in state action, is
146 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
147 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
148 Id. at 265. "Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law which
petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms
of speech and press.... The test is not the form in which state power has been
applied but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.
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the public defender case, Polk County v. Dodson.'49 In this case,
the Supreme Court held that the public defender is not engaged in
state action because although she is paid by the state, and
employed by the state, she is an adversary of the state, and acts for
the client, not under color of state law, but under the attorney/client
relationship.'50 That is an exception, but an exception that has not
been extended. For example, the doctor in a prison context, as in
West v. Atkins,'5 is held to be a state actor, even though the doctor
has as much duty to the patient as lawyer has to the client.' 2 The
doctor is not an adversary of the state. I think that is the main
distinction.
I think that the case of the official who acts in violation of state
law presents the more difficult problem. Professor Chemerinsky is
absolutely right that the mere fact that the official acts in violation
of state law does not mean there is no state action. However, the
harder question is whether this individual, and, again, it could be
whether the actor was on-duty or off-duty, was acting as an
individual following personal pursuits, or whether the individual,
although violating state law, was nevertheless exercising
government authority. I think that framing the issue is not
difficult, but I think the answer is certainly not always obvious
when you look at the fact patterns of these cases. For example, in
149 454 U.S. 312 (1981). Respondent alleged that petitioner, who had been
assigned to represent him in an appeal of a criminal conviction to the Iowa
Supreme Court, failed to represent him adequately since she has moved for
permission to withdraw as counsel on the ground that respondent's claims were
legally frivolous. Id.
150 See Polk, 454 U.S. 312. See also Schwartz, § 5.6 at 499-500. Polk County
did not hold that a public defender never acts under color of state law, but only
that he does not do so with respect to his representative function. Id.
"'t 487 U.S. 42 (1988). Respondent, a private doctor under contract with the
state of North Carolina to provide orthopedic services at a state-prison hospital
on a part-time basis, treated petitioner for a leg injury sustained while petitioner
was incarcerated in state prison. Petitioner was barred by state law from
employing or electing to see a doctor of his own choosing. Petitioner alleged
that he was given inadequate medical treatment, and sued respondent in Federal
District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Eight Amendment
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
152 Id. at 49; see SCHVARTZ, § 5.6 at 503. Polk County was distinguished on
the ground that the public defender was an adversary of the state. Id.
[Vol 16792
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the sexual abuse and harassment cases,' a number of these cases
concern police officers who are looking for sexual favors, and
when you read fact patterns, I think it is far from obvious whether
it is a personal pursuit taking place or use of government power.
Often it is a combination of both, a personal pursuit and use of
government power. It is a use of government power to further a
personal pursuit. Perhaps the best a trial judge can do with this
issue is to give it to the jury, assuming that enough has been
alleged in the complaint. This is what we do with many difficult
questions. We tell the jury to decide whether the official was
exercising government power or whether the official was acting as
an individual. We are seeing more and more cases in which that is
the holding of the court.
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
That is a recent trend. Until very recently, I think the courts
would have said the issue of whether someone is under color of
law and the issue is the action is purely a legal question for the
judge. It is interesting now to see it being given as ajury question.
The other point in response to what Professor Schwartz has
mentioned is something I did not include in the outline, although it
is in the later material. It is a Ninth Circuit case called Van Ort v.
Stanewich.'"
There was a police officer in San Diego that had a very long
disciplinary record.'55 Nevertheless, he stayed on the job and was
promoted. The police officer received a tip that there was a
grandmother living with a grandson who had a safe which
contained a sizeable amount of money.'" He went in with a
warrant, did a search, found the safe, which did contain money
and jewelry.157
153 See, e.g., Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Twoed, 944 F2d 476 (9th Cir.
1991).
'-4 92 F.3d 831 (9th Cir. 1997). Professor Chemerinsky represented the
plaintiff on appeal.
155 Id.
156 id.
157 Id. at 834.
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The officer did not arrest anyone as there were no alleged crimes
alleged committed.'58 He went back the next day when he was off
duty, and the grandson answered the door and said, "Oh, Officer
Stanewich, you're here again."'59 Stanewich then bolts the door,
ties up the grandmother and her grandson, and literally tortures
them to get them to tell him the combination of the safe. 6 ' He put
lighter fluid in the grandson's eyes and threatened to set him on
fire, and he inserted needles between the grandmother's fingers. 6'
At some point, the grandson's girlfriend managed to sneak out the
back door and call the police.'62 The police officer arrived and told
Stanewich to stop what he was doing. Stanewich refused to
comply, at which time the police officer then killed the off-duty
police officer Stanewich. 63  Subsequently, the grandmother and
grandson bring a lawsuit. Stanewich's estate had no assets, so they
sued the county. The argument against the county is its policy of
inadequate supervision and inadequate monitoring of discipline
problems is what really caused the injuries." The jury issued a
special verdict that found that the officer was under color of law.'65
The Ninth Circuit reversed. The Ninth Circuit held that the
officer was off duty."6 The officer was, therefore, not acting under
color of law.67 As a result, it is not a question for the jury at all; it
is a question of law for the judge and, as such, reversed the jury's
finding.'68 The Supreme Court denied certiorari and refused to hear
the case. 69
JUDGE PRATT:
158 Id.
'59 Van Ort, 92 F.3d at 834.160 id.
161 id.
1621id.
163 id.
'64 Id. at 833.
165 Van Ort, 92 F.3d at 835.
'66 Id. at 841.
167 Id. at 838.
168 Id. at 841.
169 id.
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Professor Chemerinksy, that is typical of the Ninth Circuit. It is
often wrong. I do not know how you can say that questions of
whether a police officer is acting on his own or under color of state
law, whether he was wearing his uniform, whether he was carrying
his gun, what he said, how the activities arose, questions which are
so fact intensive, could be anything other than jury questions. But I
am a long way from having to make those decisions.
Judge Raggi, what is your reaction to that?
JUDGE RAGGI:
I do think a considerable number of the cases about law
enforcement officers are going to come before juries. I think the
other situation that the Professors discussed that what is more
difficult to send to ajury is the question of the private actor. I think
the reason the courts have always been very nervous about
reaching too far to take private actors - and thereby, letting
discrete cases decide whether they are or are not covered by state
action - is that, on some basic level, we do want to encourage
people to use courts and processes to resolve disputes rather than
to duke it out in the street. Therefore, the notion that could
automatically or somehow otherwise bring you into 1983 liability
is that there is the line drawing problem. I think we have gleaned in
that situation toward letting judges and courts draw the lines.
However, I think whether on any given day an individual police
officer or law enforcement officer is acting in a state action or
private capacity is something the juries can decide.
JUDGE PRATT:
Judge Batts, where do you stand on this?
JUDGE BATTS:
The case that Professor Chemerinsky just described in California
is troubling to me for a number of reasons. One of the points that I
was curious about was whether there was any theory that, because
the police officer obtained this information derivatively from his
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official function or there was some direction that he would not
have known that but for the fact he was a police officer, was that a
factor that was considered?
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
I argued that on appeal, but the court did not give it any weight.
I argued he got the knowledge as a police officer, he went and did
the search the day before as a police officer, and the reason that the
grandson opened the door was that it was somebody who he
recognized from the day before as being a police officer and let
him in again.7 None of those factors mattered to the Ninth
Circuit. The Ninth Circuit said what was key was he was off duty
and entirely on his own at the time and, therefore, was not under
color of law.'
PROF. SCHWARTZ:
There was an issue in that case concerning the relationship
between the no state action holding and municipal liability.' The
Ninth Circuit held that if the individual defendant is found not to
engage in state action, the county is automatically off the hook.'
That does not seem to be correct, because it would seem that even
when state action is engaged in by a non-state actor, the county
should be responsible for its own constitutional wrong?
I think that is an argument that you made.
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
It definitely is. I would use this case as the occasion to
distinguish the Van Xiong case I mentioned. Van Xiong was the
main authority in the Ninth Circuit, but the Ninth Circuit
distinguished Van Xong, because the social worker expressly was
using his governmental authority to set up meetings with the
170 See Van Ort v. Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 834 (9th Cir 1996).
171 Id. at 836.
172 id.
173 id.
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women who he then sexually harassed.'74 Whereas, in Stanewich,
the court said the officer may have gotten the knowledge from the
government job, and maybe that is why the door was opened, but
there was not an express indication of government authority.'75
Rather, in the cases that you litigate, should the extent to which the
private officer is explicitly verses non-explicitly using government
authority matter? I question it.
PROF. SCHWARTZ:
Let's get to the difficult problem. That is the discussion Judge
Raggi raised about private entities and individuals and whether
they are engaged in state action. The ultimate question is whether
these organizations are engaged in state action. They are treated as
questions of law, ultimately, the courts want to make that big
determination, but there can be subsidiary factual issues.
Therefore, in some cases it would have to be left to the jury to
resolve what subsidiary factual issues in terms of the nature of the
involvement of the government and private entity. Based upon
those findings, the court can then make the state action rulings as a
matter of law.
JUDGE RAGGI:
I am sure your jury instruction book that we are waiting for tells
us we are not supposed to just ask juries whether they find liability
or not, but rather ask them those factual questions, and then based
on the answers you get, the court enters judgment.
JUDGE PRATT:
We push hard for special verdicts, although, whenever there is a
case for special verdicts, I think it is still permissible to frame
instructions that submit the entire issue to the jury to decide in
effect as a general verdict.
PROF. SCHWARTZ:
'74 Van Ort, 92 F.3d at 839.175 id
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One of the points Erwin made that I think has a practical
litigation significance is that there really are two lines of state
action decisions, the Warren court decisions and the post-Warren
court decisions.76 Even though none of the Warren court decisions
actually have been overturned, maybe with the exception of
Burton,'" I don't think they represent, the current thinking of the
United States Supreme Court. Most lower court judges probably
understand that, so in terms of litigation, I think it gets more and
more risky to rely upon those Warren court precedents.
When we look at the more recent precedents, some of things I
will say may be a little different than the way Erwin described the
entanglement test and public function test.'78 When I studied the
area, I saw four possible tests. I saw a sufficiently close nexus test,
which would ask whether the government has either coerced or
significantly encouraged the private conduct.'79 Those words are
important because it is not just authorization, that's clearly not
enough under more recent Supreme Court decisions, its not enough
for the government to just authorize, it must coerce or significantly
encourage the private conduct. I think, when we look at American
Manufacturers in a few moments in more detail, it's not even
enough for the government to encourage the private conduct; the
government must significantly encourage it. This, of course, is a
question of degree. I do not really know how to draw that line.
Then, I think there is also a joint participation test which you
describe as arcane.' The main issue I think is whether it is a joint
action, a concerted action, or a conspiratorial action between the
government and private sector.' It's a little different type of
inquiry. The public function test, definitely is a separate test,
176 See generally Robert Jerome Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the
Civil Rights Movement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 869 (1994) (examining the expansion
of federal court review of state actions under the Warren court).177 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 41, at § 6.4.4.3. "Burton never has been
overruled. Yet, practically speaking, it may be a relic of the era, before the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, when the Supreme Court tried to find ways to apply the
Constitution to forbid private discrimination." Id.
178 Id. at § 6.4.4.2.
179 See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345,352 (1975).180 See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 41, at § 6.4.4.3.
is' American Manufacturers, 119 S. Ct. 984-85.
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assuming it's a real test, which I'm not too sure about. We will
come back to that also. Then, I would, at least, prior to American
Manufacturers, have listed symbiotic relationship." I am treating
Burton v. Wilmington' as a separate state action doctrine, I would
have said before American Manufacturers that the Supreme Court
had significantly narrowed this doctrine to cases in which it was
shown that the government actually profited or gained in some
way, from the constitutional wrongdoing,"u which plaintiffs never
seem to be able to show. But I am not sure that symbiotic
relationship is much of a doctrine anymore after American
Manufacturers. Therefore, I saw four potential doctrines, and I
saw a couple of other cases, types of free-floaters that don't fit too
well in any doctrine. West v. Atkins,' s the prison physician case, I
guess you would say is all over the place. It doesn't depend on any
particular doctrine, although it's attempted to be explained in
American Manufacturers as a public functions case." I think the
peremptory challenge decisions stand on their own, so I see the
whole area slightly differently than you do.
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
I do not think it matters much as to whether it is called two or
four categories. I think Marty's categories of sufficient nexus and
joint participation and symbiotic relationship are all ways of
looking at the government's involvement in finding state action in
private conduct. Sufficient nexus is really all about how closely
tied is the government relationship. Joint participation is looking
at what is the government's involvement with the private conduct.
182 See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
183 id
14See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) (holding that a private
school was not acting under color of state lav when it fired its employees
because its relationship with the state was the same as any other contractor);
Moose Lodge Number 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding "there is
nothing approaching the symbiotic relationship between lessor and lessee that
was present in Burton"); Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National
Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (finding that federal licensing of broadcast
stations is not sufficient government involvement for state action).
"8 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
_ American Manufacturers, 119 S. Ct. at 987-88.
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Symbiotic relationship is to what extent the government is
benefiting from and even involved with the private conduct. I
think the peremptory challenge cases are about that.187 I group
them together under entanglement. The interesting thing is, in the
most recent case we can look to, American Manufacturers, Justice
Rehnquist seems to divide it into two areas. One-half of the
opinion is dealing with the entanglement issue and the latter half of
the opinion deals with public function. That is another reason
there may be some conceptual reason to think in that way.
PROF. SCHWARTZ:
A couple of things about American Manufacturers. One thing to
keep in mind is that the Third Circuit in this case had unanimously
found state action. 88 I think the importance of this Supreme Court
decision cannot be overlooked. You can ask the question, Why did
the Supreme Court hear this case if for no other reason than to
narrow the state action doctrine? One of the points that comes out
of all of the post-Warren court state action decisions in my mind,
and this is reinforced by American Manufacturers, is that the
quantity of state involvement does not do it. The focus from the
Supreme Court is much more on the particular type of state
involvement. Is the state coercing? Is the state significantly
encouraging? What type of function has been delegated? We have
case after case in which the quantity of state involvement is great,
but state action is not found.8 9 Erwin mentioned Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn.!"' That was a school for maladjusted children, not only
187 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (hoiding peremptory
challenge must not be based on either the race of the juror or the racial
sterotypes held by the party).
188 See Sullivan v. Barnett, 139 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 1998). The Third Circuit
specifically held that "in creating and executing this system of entitlements, the
Commonwealth has enacted a complex and interwoven regulatory web enlisting
the Bureau, the employers, and the insurance companies . . . in effect, they
become an arm of the State, fulfilling a uniquely governmental obligation under
an entirely state-created, self-contained public benefit system." Id. at 168.
189 See, e.g., Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982); Blum v. Yaretsky,
457 U.S. 991 (1982) (involving government funding of medicaid where states
funded over 90% of patient expenses).
190 Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 830.
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licensed and extensively regulated by the state, but one year it got
over 90 percent of its funds from the state. It was clearly carrying
out a function, you may not call it a public function, but it was
clearly carrying out a function of education for maladjusted
children that the state would otherwise have to carry out.' You
put all of that together, and still, seven to two, no state action."-
The same thing with utility companies. You mentioned the
Jackson case. You think about all the government involvement
with utility companies; granting monopoly power, regulating,
approving tariffs, important public service being carried out, and
there is no state action. We do not know a government entity when
we see one, meaning a utility company is as close to being a
government entity without actually being a government entity. I
think that is also true in American Manufacttrers.
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
I very much agree with Marty in terms of significance of this
case. Let me just give you a little factual background. It involves
Pennsylvania's Workers' Compensation Law.' Pennsylvania
amended the Workers' Compensation Law to say that the
employer and its insurance company only had to pay medical bills
that were reasonable and necessary, and it created a utilization
review procedure. 95 When an insurance company felt that medical
191 Id at 842.
192 Id at 843.
193 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Company, 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (finding no
state action, the Court held that running a utility company is "not traditionally
the exclusive prerogative of the state").
'94 American Manufacturers, 119 S. Ct. at 982.
195 Id.; see also 77 PA. CONS. STAT. § 531(6) (West 1998). This section
specifically provides:
(6) Except in those cases in which a workers' compensation judge
asks for an opinion from peer review under section 420, disputes
as to reasonableness or necessity of treatment by a health care
provider shall be resolved in accordance with the following
provisions:
(i) The reasonableness or necessity of all treatment provided by a
health care provider under this act may be subject to prospective,
concurrent or retrospective utilization review at the request of an
employee, employer or insurer. The department shall authorize
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bills weren't reasonable and necessary, they could forward them to
the state-created utilization review board to hold a hearing to
decide whether or not payment had to be given. 96  The case
involves, several individuals who under Workers' Compensation
Law had claims for medical expenses that insurance companies
found were not reasonable and necessary and had forwarded to the
utilization review procedure.'97 The question is: whether there is
state action here?'
All of this is created by state law, all of the procedures are
specified by state law, and the utilization review procedure is
entirely an entity of state law. For that reason, as Marty said, the
Third Circuit found there to be state action."9 The United States
Supreme Court reversed unanimously."o Justice Rehnquist wrote
the opinion for the Court. The Court concluded that because it's a
private employer, it is a private utilization review procedure, it's
not state action."' The significance of the case in the long term is
utilization review organizations to perform utilization review
under this act. Utilization review of all treatment rendered by a
health care provider shall be performed by a provider licensed in
the same profession and having the same or similar specialty as
that of the provider of the treatment under review. Organizations
not authorized by the department may not engage in such
utilization review.
(ii) The utilization review organization shall issue a written report
of its findings and conclusions within thirty (30) days of a request.
(iii) The employer or the insurer shall pay the cost of the
utilization review.
(iv) If the provider, employer, employee or insurer disagrees with
the finding of the utilization review organization, a petition for
review by the department must be filed within thirty (30) days
after receipt of the report. The department shall assign the petition
to a workers' compensation judge for a hearing or for an informal
conference under section 402.1. The utilization review report shall
be part of the record before the workers' compensation judge. The
workers' compensation judge shall consider the utilization review
report as evidence but shall not be bound by the report.
Id.
196 jd at 983.
1971d at 983-84.
'9' Id. at 984-85.
'99 Sullivan, 139 F.3d at 170.
200 American Manufacturers, 119 S. Ct. at 982.
201 Id. at 989.
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what the Supreme Court says about each of the exceptions to the
state action doctrine identified.
As to the entanglement exception, the Supreme Court says the
entanglement exception only applies if the government causes the
private entity to violate the Constitution. °" The government entity
has to coerce it or cause the behavior to occur.0 3 The key obstacle
to the Supreme Court's holding was Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority. 4 In Burton, the defense was that the city didn't coerce
or cause the private restaurant to racially discriminate and the
Supreme Court rejected that.'0 The Supreme Court said the
government had the power as a term of the lease to prevent
discrimination and government can't avoid its responsibility by
abdication."0 Rehnquist in American Manufactures says Burton
was an early state action case no longer to be followed." 7 I do not
think that's an express overruling of the holding of Burton. I think,
if the facts of Burton happen again, the case would come out the
same way, if nothing else under Title II Civil Rights Act.
However, this does say that the symbiotic relationship analysis of
Burton is no longer to be followed.
The second part of American Manufactures involves the public
functions exception.28 The argument here was that the utilization
review procedure is really performing a public function, that the
Constitution should be applied here.' ° The Supreme Court rejects
that argument as well. The Supreme Court says that, even though
the government has created the mechanism, even though the
government has mandated the procedures, that's not enough for
state action. i Here is what I think is the practical significance for
you: there is an important unresolved issue of whether state
mandated dispute resolution constitutes state action and has to
comply with the Constitution. I think most states have laws that
202 Id at 986.
203 id.
204 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (holding state action exists where government leases
space to restaurant that racially discriminates).205 Id. at 725.
206 id.
207 American Manufacturers, 119 S. Ct. at 988-89.
208 Id at 987.
209 Id at 988.
210 id
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mandate arbitration for particular kinds of claims."' Another issue
is are the private arbiters and the private mediators to be regarded
as state actors to comply with the Constitution? It's a huge issue,
and it's really on the cutting edge. I think the language in
American Manufactures suggests they are not state actors even
though it's a state-mandated procedure and the state has dictated
the procedure to be followed.
PROF. SCHWARTZ:
The one exception is this curious statement in the Court's
opinion where the Chief Justice says that the utilization review
committee itself, like that of any judicial official, may properly be
considered state action." This is puzzling from a few different
respects. From a fairly anti-state action court, why the gratuity?
Secondly, what is the basis for concluding that the utilization
review committee, as compared to the private insurance
companies, was engaged in state action? I could only think that,
when he says that the utilization review committee, like any
judicial body, was engaged in state action that he must have been
thinking public function doctrine.
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
Because the case really is about the insurance company's choice
not to pay the claims, I think they are saying, if it's a government
entity itself, then its decisions are state action. The utilization
review board itself is a government actor in what it does, but when
it comes to what private actors do, I think, it would be private
conduct and it wouldn't be state action, even though the operating
procedure is state mandated procedures.
PROF. SCHWARTZ:
211 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 198 (a) (g) (McKinney 1998). New York
consumers who invoke rights under automobile "lemon law" may be required to
participate in mandatory arbitration.
212 American Manufacturers, 119 S. Ct. at 987.
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The utilization review committee consisted of private health care
providers, right? And to that extent, it is a group of private
entities, the same way the NCAA is a private entity.
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
I interpret the sentence differently. I think what the Supreme
Court is saying there is the government board itself is a
government entity, even though it's staffed by people who in the
rest of their lives are private doctors. I served for two years as a
volunteer, but I was elected by the voters on a city commission in
Los Angeles.
Anything I did in my role of Commissioner was government
action, though I was unpaid for it and I was a private law professor
in the rest of my life. I think that utilization review board is a
government body, so, its decisions are state action regardless of the
individuals comprising the body at the time.
PROF. URBONYA:
Assuming the constitutionality of school vouchers, are there
circumstances in which private schools would become state actors?
I was listening to the Institute for Justice on the American Way and
you can hardly tell which side is which side based on the title of
these interest groups. The Institute for Justice said, and this is the
side that is for vouchers, the last thing the private schools want are
government regulations. They don't want to be subject to Title IX,
they don't want the regulations, and the other side doesn't want
vouchers. However, if we are going to have them, we want lots of
regulations. What would it take to make a private school a state
actor and have to comply with state action requirements?
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
My answer would be that Rendell-Baker v. Kohn says even if the
school gets 90 percent of its funds from the government, that's not
enough for state action. " 3 Therefore, even if the voucher was a
213 Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 830.
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virtual total subsidy, that wouldn't be enough for state action. I
have put aside the establishment question and I have put aside the
ability of the government to put conditions on the vouchers, like,
certain educational requirements, which they could do as part of
the grant. I can say based on Rendell-Baker v. Kohn the voucher is
not going to be enough for state action.
PROF. SCHWARTZ:
I want to come back to the public function doctrine. I have
always been interested in this doctrine, and, Erwin, I can one-up
you in terms of making bad law here because I lost Flagg
Brothers.214 The Court keeps talking about the function having to
be an exclusive government function, and I keep thinking that is a
test nobody can satisfy. If you apply it in a true fashion, even the
private prison case, which presents a very compelling case to find
state action based on the public function doctrine." 5 How can we
say that a private prison is carrying out a function that is
historically and exclusively a governmental function? Not only do
we have a lot of private prisons now, but look at the qualified
immunity question for private prison guards in Richardson v.
McKnight.2 6 The Supreme Court, in tracing the history said we
have had a lot of private prisons in the past as well, So is public
function a real test?2"7 I have problems with this word "exclusive."
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
214 435 U.S. 149 (1978).
215 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997); Street v. Corrections
Corporation of America, 102 F.3d 810 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding actions of
private prison guards are state action arising under color of state law); Blumel v.
Mylander, 919 F. Supp. 423 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (finding a private company's
operation of a jail constitutes state action under the public functions exception);
Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch and Center, 990 F. Supp. 498 (N.D. Tex 1998)
(holding private juvenile residential treatment center is a state actor as to a
juvenile who is involuntarily committed).216 id
217 Id. at 404. See also Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158 (1992); City of Newport
v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); Owen v. City of Independence,
Missouri, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
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I think you make a terrific point because in none of these cases
can it be said that the government has exclusively done it. There
have long been company owned towns, so you can't say running a
town is exclusively a government function. t8 You are right, as
private prisons increase, if you go back to the early days of the
country, governments entered contracts with private prisons and
jails. Maybe the way of understanding all of this is, if the Supreme
Court is doing an unstated balancing, what is really going on in the
state action cases is a balancing of whether or not the Constitution
needs to apply. We both agree the Court is much more willing to
find state action in the race cases, because the Court says that we
need to apply the Constitution, unstated balancing. t9 In other
areas, the Court is less willing to find state action, balancing.
I think in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, the Court says a
private utility is not a state actor and need not provide due process
before terminating a service. -'  I think, in the prison cases, the
Court is saying it's so important to provide prisoners the
protections of the Constitution, minimal as they may now be, and I
don't think the Court is willing to say we are going to leave the
prisoners without any protection against criminal and illegal
punishment. That reflects the natural mechanical application of the
words of the test.
PROF. SCHWARTZ:
The Supreme Court has never actually said that we use different
state action principles in race cases as compared to non-race cases.
I remember this came up at oral argument in the Flagg Brothers
case when my adversary argued, this case does not involve
anything like racial discrimination. Justice Marshall, if you
remember his manner, responds to my adversary, no, it involves
something important like procedural due process. To say, that
there are these two lines of cases, one for race and one for non-race
218 But see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding company-owned
town is a state actor and must comply with the First Amendment).
219 See Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455 (1973).
2
'
0 Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352.
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cases, it's an interesting observation, it might be accurate, but it's
not supported by an explicit decision.
I still want to explore public function a little further, such as in
the prison doctor case, West v. Atkins.22' As I said before, if you
read that decision, that's a unanimous holding that there is state
action when the state hires the prison doctor to provide medical
care for the inmates.m But the decision doesn't seem to be based
upon any particular doctrine, it's based on a whole variety of
factors that the Supreme Court has identified. Such as the prisoners
have no choice when it comes to medical care, and the state is
constitutionally obligated to provide medical care to prisoners."m
However, in American Manufacturers, Chief Justice Rehnquist
attempts to explain West v. Atkins as a decision that in fact was
based on the public function doctrine.' That does not make any
sense to me either because how can you say that the provision of
medical care to inmates is an exclusive governmental function.
That makes no sense at all. Certainly, the medical care is not
provided only by doctors hired by the government but also by
public officials. I am wondering whether what the Court maybe
means is that it is an exclusive governmental obligation.
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
I think conceptualizing this government obligation rather than
government functions helps to explain the cases. Yet, I find, the
Polk County case' to be difficult to reconcile from that
perspective because in Gideon v. Wainwright the government has
the obligation to provide the legal services."' This notion in that
the public defender is adverse to the government, so that's not state
action is expressly rejected in Georgia v. McCollum.227 Just as the
criminal defense lawyer is supposed to do everything to serve the
client, even though it may go against what the government wants, a
22'487 U.S. 42 (1988).22 Id. at 57.
24American Manufacturers, 119 S. Ct. at 987-88.
25Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
226 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
227 500 U.S. 42 (1992).
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doctor is supposed to do everything to serve the patient and the
patient's needs even though it goes against what the government
wants.
JUDGE PRATT:
How would it go against the government for the doctor to be
serving the patient?
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
The government says we don't want to spend money for the
treatment.
JUDGE PRATT:
Just for the cost of the service?
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
My guess is that happens a lot.
JUDGE PRATT:
That's not really a good analogy to the lawyer's position where
his function is to fight the prosecutor.
PROF. CHEMERINSKY:
My question is: If what we are looking at is government duty,
why is that a distinction that should matter? The government has
the duty to provide legal services to those unable to afford it even
more than the government has the duty to provide medical care to
inmates. There is a duty under cases like Estelle that is clear.'
m Estelle v. Gamble 429 U.S. 97 (1976). The Court held that while deliberate
indifference to prisoner's serious illness or injury constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment, prisoner's pro se complaint
failed to state a cause of action against physician both in his capacity as treating
physician and as a medical director of the corrections department. Id. at 98.
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I'm saying, from Marty's perspective, if you look just at
government duty, Polk County seems wrong if the distinction is
that the public defender is adverse to the government. Georgia v.
McCollum says the public defender's excessive peremptory
challenge is the state action even though the public defender is
adverse to the government." 9
229 McCollum, 500 U.S. at 52.
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